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  I disagree with almost everything in David L. Lewis’s article, “The Promise and 
Peril of Class in the Problem of the 20
th Century,” except his conclusion.  His depiction 
of American history is mistaken in many particulars, his concern about the Radical Right 
is overblown, and his claim that middle-class blacks are joining the conservative 
counterrevolution is not supported by the facts.  But his final message – that the United 
States is a society divided by class and race, and that poor Americans may be even worse 
off in the future than they have been in the recent past -- may well be correct.  If it is, 
then it is all the more important to get the causal story straight so that those of us for 
whom this conclusion is abhorrent can focus on the right allies and opponents.  The 
Radical Right is not very influential and wealthy conservative African Americans are few 
and far between; the real danger lies in the casual self-absorption of almost all Americans 
and the alienation of well-off blacks from the political and social mainstream.   
 
  Let me spell out this argument first by disagreeing with Mr. Lewis, then by 
agreeing with him, and finally by venturing my own prescriptions.  My disagreements are 
both small and large.  A few small ones:   
•  Tocqueville did not “obviously” think that Jacksonian Americans were off to 
a good start; he was deeply worried about the future of the United States and 
deeply ambivalent about democracy; 
•  Tocqueville’s viruses were in fact “truly problematic” long before 
“comparatively recently.”  Between 1840 and 1998, our nation fought a bitter 
and prolonged Civil War, witnessed several decades of violent confrontation 
between labor and capital, interned Japanese Americans in something close to 
concentration camps, had several more decades of cold war against supposed 
Communists, and enjoyed a half-decade of almost continual racial riots in the 
summer and campus unrest during the rest of the year.   In that context, 
Patrick Buchanan and the Christian Coalition do not particularly stand out.  
•  Americans do not “now live politically and culturally on an increasingly 
darkling plain swept by the confused alarms of struggle and flight between the 
Left and the Right.”  An unprecedented two-thirds of Americans approve of 
the job the President is doing.  Surveys of public opinion show no increase in 
polarization on any issue since the 1970s with the possible exception of 
abortion.  More detailed analyses of survey data show a rough centrist 
coalition for abortion rights (“safe, legal, and rare”) and affirmative action 
(approval of “soft” forms, rejection of “hard” forms [along with the Supreme 
Court and many African Americans]).  Alan Wolfe is winning at least as much 
acclaim for pronouncing Americans to be “one nation, after all” as James Davison Hunter ever won for declaring our nation to be engaged in a “culture 
war.”  Ross Perot, Patrick Buchanan, and Jesse Jackson have faded from the 
electoral landscape and no protest candidates have arisen to take their place.  
•  There is no “national decline” in public schools, and probably none in 
universities (although I know less about them).  Most public schools are 
producing students who are marginally better educated than students were 
thirty years ago.  A few public schools are truly atrocious, and I will say more 
about them below.  
•  It is not true that the Radical Right’s “alloy” of “the politics of resentment 
[and] that of economic royalism” has “seldom” been seen before. That is the 
absolutely classic alloy – seen in Jacksonian populism (Andrew Jackson was a 
major land and currency speculator), turn-of-the-century Southern Populism,  
and even contemporary left-wing populism (consider the leftist politics of  
most academics and some nouveau-riche Silicon Valley entrepreneurs).  So 
the Radical Right is following in well-worn tracks. 
•  Defenders of multiculturalism are not “increasingly beleaguered” and 
affirmative action is not being “gutted.”  Most schools and teachers now claim 
to teach multiculturalism in their curricula and foster it in their activities; most 
corporate executives sing the praises of diversity.  No state has followed in the 
wake of California's Proposition 209.  President Clinton is on record as 
supporting affirmative action and Congress refuses to take up anti-affirmative 
action bills.  I am not claiming that multiculturalism has gone much more than 
skindeep in classrooms or public sentiments, or that supporters of affirmative 
action can rest easy – they cannot.  But the apocalyptic language with which 
Mr. Lewis discusses these and other issues distracts us from the real problems 
onto side issues.  
 
And so on.  I do not bring up these disagreements (and there are others) merely as 
debating points. The issues that Mr. Lewis raises are too important to permit that sort of 
indulgence. In fact, it is precisely because the issues are so important that we need to 
distinguish between real trends and political ebbs and flows, between historically 
unprecedented developments and old wine in new bottles.  Thus it may not matter to 
people other than professors of American political thought how ambivalent Tocqueville 
really was, but it should matter to all of us whether our nation is engaged in a culture war, 
and whether schools are getting better or worse.  
 
  Let me turn to two major disagreements between Mr. Lewis and myself that these 
smaller ones presage.  First, I see no grounds for believing that the Radical Right is 
taking over American politics.  More Americans identify themselves as fundamentalist or 
otherwise deeply religious than do citizens of any other western nation, but those beliefs 
seldom translate into public policies.  Prayer is not permitted in schools; publicly-funded 
vouchers probably will not be useable in religious schools once the constitutional dust 
settles; private religious school attendance is not rising.  Abortion has not been outlawed; 
more women are in the work force than ever before.  No plausible presidential candidate 
evinces much religiosity; the right hates President Clinton at least as much as the left 
does, and rightwingers were not much happier with Bob Dole.  No New Deal social welfare policy except ADFC has been gutted.  Americans still claim to be eager to help 
the poor – they just believe (probably rightly) that the old welfare system did not do so.  
Whether workfare makes the poor worse off on balance is still in question; I believe that 
in many states it will once the economy sours, but we have insufficient evidence for any 
certainty.  Nativist sentiment is indeed rising, but so far immigration restrictions are fairly 
minimal, and as more and more immigrants become voting citizens the politics of 
immigration policy could turn around. Where are the grounds for saying that the Radical 
Right has taken over American politics? 
 
  My other major point of disagreement with Mr. Lewis focuses on the increasing 
conservatism of the black middle class.  He is right to say that well-off blacks are 
somewhat more conservative than are poor blacks on pocketbook issues – they prefer 
lower taxes, fewer restrictions on economic activity, and less social welfare spending.  
Even here, however, the data are neither strong nor consistent.  What does come through 
strongly and consistently in surveys and electoral politics is the fact that well-off African 
Americans remain much more liberal on government taxing and spending issues than do 
comparably well-off whites.   Barely a tenth of African Americans identify with the 
Republican party.  Blacks are, as Mr. Lewis says, more culturally conservative on 
average than are whites – but the most culturally conservative are the working class and 
poor African Americans, not the well-off, and even Mr. Lewis is not worried that 
working class and poor blacks are flocking to the Republican party.  
 
  What does distinguish middle-class from poor blacks, and from most whites, 
Latinos, and Asian Americans, is their increasing disaffection from the nation as a whole.  
Better-educated African Americans are more likely than poorly-educated African 
Americans to believe that the government invented the AIDS virus in order to infect the 
black community and that the government deliberately brings drugs into black 
neighborhoods in order to debilitate them.  In the 1960s, the worst-off third of blacks 
were more likely than the best-off third to believe that whites were actively hostile to the 
black community; by the 1980s, those positions were reversed.  Racial nationalism has 
risen throughout the black community during the 1990s, but especially among the middle 
class.  Middle class blacks are skeptical, at best, of school desegregation; contemporary 
culture heros promote nationalism and scorn integrationism.  On balance, that pattern 
does not hold for Latinos and Asian Americans, most of whom seek eagerly, even 
urgently, to move into the social, economic, and political mainstream as they understand 
it.  
 
  Thus Americans’ problems over the next decade are not fighting off an ascendent 
Radical Right, winning or simply surviving a broad culture war, coping with deteriorating 
schools, recreating New Deal social policies, or wooing middle class African Americans 
back to liberalism.  Those problems exist only on the fringes.  What Americans do need 
to come to grips with (although they may not choose to do so) is the class disparity, 
intersecting with racial disparity, that Mr. Lewis addresses at the end of his essay.  If 
most schools are pretty good and getting slightly better, some are horrendous.  In fourteen 
schools in Hartford, Connecticut, fewer than 5 % of fourth-graders have achieved grade-
level competence in state reading and math tests.  In 15 out of the 18 high schools in Washington D.C., just over 5% of students are reading at grade level – and children in 
Washington schools fall further and further behind their presumed grade level as they 
move from elementary to high school.   No reader of The Good Society, or of the 
National Review, would keep his or child in such a school for a day, and yet we as a 
society (both Democrats and Republicans) tolerate the continuance of such schools for 
children of color.  Democratic as well as Republican politicians shy away from any 
political stance that sounds like “class warfare,” and Democratic as well as Republican 
voters strongly endorsed the welfare “reforms” of 1996.   
 
  It is not surprising that most Americans seek to protect their own children from 
nonfunctional schools, and seek to move to the suburbs to protect their families from real 
or perceived high levels of crime.  After all, as Robert Dahl pointed out to my graduate 
seminar three decades ago, why should anyone identify downward, with those who have 
no money, social status, or political clout, if they can identify upward with those who 
have the resources they want?  Few politicians or political parties give Americans any 
reason to ally with the weak rather than with the strong, or any institutionalized paths for 
doing so. Policies ranging from the national highway system to municipal boundaries to 
functional divisions among social welfare agencies make it even harder for the nonpoor 
to connect with the poor in any long-term or constructive way.  
 
The fact that the deeply poor are disproportionately, if not absolutely, more likely 
to be people of color adds a further barrier between them and the aspiring working or 
middle classes.  We need not rehearse here all the reasons why members of the white 
working class distance themselves from members of the supposed black “underclass;” in 
that context, the Radical Right seems almost epiphenomenal.  Here is where the 
increasing alienation of affluent blacks from mainstream society and politics is most 
deeply damaging.  If middle class African Americans chose to do everything they could 
to enter and change the political system themselves, and to help poorer African 
Americans do the same, they might have a noticeable impact on the calculations of 
elected officials.  And yet the proportion of African Americans who participate in 
electoral politics has been declining over the past two decades, and the proportion who 
see campaigning and voting as totally irrelevant to their lives and concerns has been 
increasing.  This is not a claim that well-off blacks have more responsibility for members 
of “their” community than well-off whites do; they do not.  We are all equally 
responsible, or not responsible, for other residents of our nation.  It is, however, a claim 
that well-off blacks are likely to be more effective political actors, both in bringing other 
African Americans into the political system and in obtaining adequate responses from it, 
than would be whites – if they chose to get engaged.  But alienation from white society, 
cynicism about conventional politics, and cultural nationalism are not conducive to the 
kind of slogging daily activity needed to overcome the racial and class barriers that 
separate city and suburb. 
 
  Thus we need not look to radical rightwingers, racists, capitalist overlords, or 
demagogues to explain “the peril of class.”  We need only to look to politics as usual; as 
Pogo famously said, “we have met the enemy and they are us.”  It will indeed, as Mr. 
Lewis says, take extraordinary efforts to overcome so many ideological, self-interested, and institutionalized reasons for the nonpoor to separate themselves from the poor.  The 
causes of America’s racial and class hierarchy are much less dramatic than Mr. Lewis 
argues, but even more deeply embedded in our history and daily practices than he claims.  
 
  What is to be done?  I cannot muster much more optimism than Mr. Lewis, but I 
agree with him in his call for a “revitalized social economics.”  In my reading of survey 
data and recent political activity, I see the greatest chance for cross-racial and cross-class 
coalitions to lie in specific policy initiatives that stay away from explicit racial zero-sum 
games.   Therein lies the (perhaps forlorn) thread of hope in workfare.  If in fact 
employers and states can be pulled and pushed into providing jobs and the associated 
support services needed to keep poor mothers in jobs, the poor will at least have a 
foothold on the proverbial ladder of opportunity.  A lousy job is probably better than no 
job at all, as most welfare recipients themselves have consistently claimed.  Similarly, 
therein lies the (perhaps forlorn) thread of hope in national voluntary achievement tests.  
If in fact school boards and teachers can be pushed and pulled into teaching children to 
read and add, the next generation of poor will have a little more chance to succeed. A test 
that fails some students but gives more the resources they need to learn is probably better 
than no test at all, as most poor parents themselves have consistently claimed.   
 
Following the same logic, I would urge progressives not to put so much psychic 
and political energy into fighting for affirmative action.   At best, it does almost nothing 
to help the deeply poor.  At worst, it distracts progressives and drains scarce resources 
from fighting for the broader, more structural reforms needed to really change the class 
position of so many African Americans. After all, we might do well to remember that 
initially affirmative action was the preferred policy of the political right, who hoped that 
sponsored mobility of a few smart and energetic African Americans would reduce 
pressure for broad society-wide changes in schooling and jobs.  It would be one of the 
worst ironies of these past few difficult decades if President Nixon turned out to be right 
in that gamble.  
 
Thus I disagree with Mr. Lewis in almost everything of relatively small 
importance in his essay, and I agree almost completely with his most important point.  
We do indeed live in a society with a deep racial and class structure, and most Americans 
do not want to face that fact or deal with its consequences.  If we are really to make any 
headway against that situation, we need to stop looking for dramatic villains and start 
looking at mundane, everyday practices that either perpetuate inequality or can be used to 
contest it.   